Steve Dunham’s Trains of Thought

Return to the home page

Return to Transportation Security Topics

Mass Transit Defends Itself Against Terrorism

By Steve Dunham

Journal of Homeland Security, March 2002. Copyright 2002 Analytic Services. Reprinted by permission.

Public transportation was under assault by terrorists long before 11 September 2001. More than 200 attacks took place worldwide from mid-1997 through the end of 2000. Terrorists used bombs, poison gas, grenades, arson, and guns to assault buses, trains, and terminals. They hijacked vehicles, took hostages, and sabotaged tracks, tunnels, and bridges.1

A recent horrifying example occurred in India on 27 February 2002, when a Muslim mob attacked a trainload of Hindus, burning 58 people—mostly women and children—to death.2

“For those determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately, public transportation offers an ideal target,” wrote Brian Michael Jenkins of the Mineta Transportation Institute.

Precisely because it is public, and used by millions of people daily, there is necessarily little security with no obvious checkpoints, like those at airports, to inspect passengers and parcels. The passengers are strangers, promising attackers anonymity and easy escape. Concentrations of people in contained environments are especially vulnerable to conventional explosives and unconventional weapons. Specifically, attacks on public transportation, the circulatory systems of urban environments, cause great disruption and alarm, which are the traditional goals of terrorism.3

The attack on the train in India is one of the worst to date in terms of casualties and religious violence against public transportation and, unfortunately, one more record for India in this area. India leads the world in attacks on public transportation and in fatalities from those attacks,4 with countries in Asia and Africa close behind. Terrorists, however, have been targeting mass transit in more industrialized countries as well. The United Kingdom and Germany each experienced six threats or attacks from mid-1997 through the end of 2000; Japan, seven; Israel, eight. Australia and Belgium suffered attacks as well.5

The United States experienced five attacks on public transportation during the early 1990s:6 In 1992, someone left a hand grenade on a railroad station platform in Chicago. In December 1994, six days apart, two bombs went off on the New York City subway. The first explosion injured two people; the second injured the bomber. In 1995, saboteurs calling themselves the “Sons of the Gestapo” derailed Amtrak’s Sunset Limited in the Arizona desert, killing one passenger and injuring 65 people. Also in 1995, a token-sales booth on a New York City subway line was set on fire; the clerk occupying the booth was severely burned. (This may have been vandalism or another form of crime rather than terrorism per se.)

So far, the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, better known by its acronym, PATH, is the U.S. transit system that has suffered the most at the hands of terrorists. PATH operates between New Jersey and New York, including tunnels (now closed) under the Hudson River to a terminal under the World Trade Center. The World Trade Center itself was constructed and operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, PATH’s parent organization. The 11 September attack put one of PATH’s two main lines out of service indefinitely, forcing passengers onto the PATH line to midtown Manhattan and onto the New Jersey Transit service into Penn Station, also in midtown.7 PATH had also experienced minor damage in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. The Port Authority plans to restore PATH service to lower Manhattan—a project that, including a temporary terminal, will cost half a billion dollars and take two years.8

Three New York City subway9 lines also suffered damage on 11 September, including the important South Ferry Station, the connecting point for the Staten Island ferries. Rebuilding the damaged lines and stations will also take years and cost hundreds of millions of dollars.10

Renewed Emphasis on Security

Because of the history of attacks on public transportation, notably in Britain, where the London Underground was repeatedly a target for the Irish Republican Army, transit system managers have long been aware of transit’s vulnerability. Even so, the 11 September 2001 attacks focused even more attention on security. “The Sept. 11 tragedy has changed my and all of our perspectives on that,” Federal Transit Administration head Jennifer Dorn told Passenger Transport. “As a result, security has gone to the top of the list.… At the same time, we can’t sacrifice the economic vitality of the communities and the transit agencies, and personal mobility and freedom.” Dorn noted that the Federal Transit Administration is doing security assessments “at 30-plus agencies.” She noted too that her administration is “in constant coordination” with the new Transportation Security Administration, which she expects to eventually take over some of the security efforts of the Federal Transit Administration, but that for now the Transportation Security Administration needs to focus on aviation.11

Security assessments are being conducted by the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) as well. Its members participate in voluntary safety management audits every three years. The association is also sponsoring industry roundtable forums on security.12

Jennifer Dorn noted that her administration “has been very cooperative with APTA and the transit providers” and said that the point of the security assessments is to “provide a value for [transit] agencies, some of whom have been doing a fantastic job and others who have not had to focus on it yet.”13

The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) is one agency that had an extensive security program before 11 September 2001, thanks to Atlanta’s hosting the 1996 Olympics, for which the agency had started planning three years ahead of time. “Numerous exercises and tabletop simulations were conducted prior to the event, including a simulation held at the civic center that focused on a takeover of a train with hostages,” wrote Shaun P. McCarthy. The transit authority “obtained advice from a counter-terrorism expert on target hardening issues. MARTA improved on many areas considered vulnerable to tampering. All the power station’s alarm systems were enhanced, perimeter fences were added to critical facilities, and bomb-resistant trash containers were placed at Olympic Ring stations. Private vehicles were banned from rail and bus facilities.”14 During the Olympics, there was a terror bombing, though not on MARTA property—it was in Centennial Park, only one block from MARTA’s Peachtree Center station.15 In September 2001, MARTA was preparing to implement a new policing strategy, which went into action the following month. “Trackwalkers and police now check for suspicious packages in tunnels and on MARTA’s rail line before trains begin running every morning,” reported APTA. “Sweeps are made at end of the line runs and on platforms. Adjacent tracks are checked hourly. Bus operators frequently inspect their vehicles, and barricades have been installed outside MARTA’s Five Points Station, a major transfer point and the busiest station in the system.”16

The Bay Area Rapid Transit rail system (known as BART) serving the San Francisco Bay area also had existing plans for dealing with terrorist attacks, including radiological, chemical, and biological incidents. Bay Area Rapid Transit

maintains an elite group of personnel who will serve as the first response team to a surface terrorism-related incident. This carefully trained group of specialists (approximately five to eight people on any given day) … can assemble at any crisis site along the 95-mile system within 45 to 60 minutes of an incident’s occurrence.

… core group members carry special suits, hoods, gloves, and other protective equipment in their cars. Protective equipment also is stored at strategic locations … known only to the specialists.17

Although it has its own response team, Bay Area Rapid Transit doesn’t plan to handle terrorists on its own. “According to agency protocol, any remotely related terrorism incident, or terrorist threat, will trigger a notification to the FBI” on account “of the FBI’s superior resources, availability of experts for rapid threat assessments and evaluation of technical feasibility, and ability to marshal other federal resources,” wrote Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten.18 The agency’s “Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Response plan and its general emergency plan are distributed to other first-responding agencies.”19

The Port Authority Transit Corporation, which operates a rapid transit line between Lindenwold (NJ) and Philadelphia, also had a security—and antiterrorism—program before 11 September 2001. In fact, on the morning of 11 September, the agency was holding an exercise involving a terrorist bomb under City Hall in Camden, NJ. As the real terrorist attacks became known, the transit agency had to shift from running an emergency drill to providing emergency transportation for the thousands of commuters who were leaving Philadelphia early, as well as substitute transportation for suspended services, such as New Jersey Transit’s trains from Atlantic City into Philadelphia.20

Emergency Operations

Providing emergency service turned out to be a major role for transit systems on 11 September 2001. Alexandria (VA) Transit, for example, on 11 September, provided emergency transportation for first responders and stranded railroad passengers.

Alexandria firefighters—but not all their vehicles—were needed at the Pentagon. The city command center asked for three buses to transport the firefighters, who were assembling at one of the firehouses, to the Pentagon and to serve as emergency ambulances if necessary.…

Amtrak and Virginia Railway Express trains leave Washington for Virginia via a tunnel under First Street on the east side of Capitol Hill, and the Secret Service closed the tunnel and sent agents through it to inspect it, stopping passenger train service till mid-afternoon. At the same time, the Washington Metro stopped operating its Yellow Line across the Potomac because it crosses the river on a bridge under the flight path of planes entering and leaving National Airport. The rail service disruptions left thousands of passengers stranded in Washington. [Alexandria Transit] sent about six buses to Washington Union Station to bring people to King Street station in Alexandria.21

From there, Alexandria Transit buses substituted for stranded Amtrak and Virginia Railway Express trains and carried people to points as far away as Fredericksburg, VA (about 45 miles), where a bus from Greater Richmond Transit, also providing emergency service, carried Amtrak passengers the rest of the way to Richmond, VA.

Similar scenes played out in other cities, where transit agencies needed operational flexibility to cope with an unplanned rush hour as commuters departed the cities and as transit provided substitute service for other disrupted modes of transportation.

The job of providing substitute service may continue long after a terrorist attack. For example, New Jersey Transit trains have experienced severe crowding since the attack on the World Trade Center, which closed one PATH line. The problem has been exacerbated by the restriction of Hudson River highway crossings to high-occupancy vehicles during rush hours.22

All New Jersey Transit trains to Manhattan use two tracks under the Hudson, which are also used by Amtrak. Unable to absorb all the former PATH riders, New Jersey Transit and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey are working to expand the region’s ferry services, which had been slowly growing during the 1990s. In January 2002, New Jersey Transit received $100 million in federal emergency funds to expand the transit infrastructure, “primarily docks and other facilities for the region’s privately owned ferry companies to use,” according to the Bergen County, NJ, Times Herald-Record.23

In addition, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has pledged $49 million to rebuild the deteriorating docks at the Hoboken train terminal—the destination for trains from Orange and Rockland counties. And NJ Transit and NY Waterway are spending $25 million to replace the Weehawken ferry terminal near the Lincoln Tunnel.…

NY Waterway, the principal operator between New Jersey and New York City, and other ferry companies have been hailed for their quick response during and after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.24

Although the attack on the Pentagon did not directly destroy any transit infrastructure, for months after the attack, highway access to and parking near Defense Department headquarters were greatly restricted, and commuter buses were routed away from the Metro station located at the giant office building’s front door. Traffic congestion on Interstate 395 became much worse than normal, and Virginia Railway Express saw a sudden jump in ridership, carrying 29 percent more passengers in September 2001 than in August. The system had already been working hard to accommodate its growing number of riders; now it was hard pressed to provide seats for them all, despite leasing two surplus trains from Seattle’s Sound Transit. In January 2002, even after the highway and parking returned to something like normal and Washington Metro had opened a new bus and subway station at the Pentagon, Virginia Railway Express was still carrying 13 percent more riders than a year earlier.25

Besides providing substitute transportation, another role for transit agencies during an emergency is to assist first responders by providing temporary shelter. When firefighters spend hours battling a blaze, for example, a bus on the scene can serve as a portable rest shelter for rescue workers, explained Sandy Modell, the general manager of Alexandria Transit.26

While providing these emergency services, transit agencies try to maintain or restore normal service as well. “Even without large numbers of casualties, disruptions to transit can seriously impact a region’s economy and the public’s faith in the government’s ability to provide basic protections to its citizens,” wrote Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten.27

“The restoration and maintenance of operations requires the agency to quickly reduce the disruptions caused by bomb threats or explosions, keep the trains and buses moving during the crisis, rapidly remove … damaged equipment, make repairs immediately, and establish alternative routes as soon as possible,” wrote Brian Michael Jenkins.28

An example of rapid restoration is the Paris Metro’s response to the 1995 afternoon rush-hour bombing at the St. Michel station that killed 7 people and injured 80.29 Thanks to existing emergency plans, the response was remarkably rapid. The Paris Fire Brigade was on the scene seven minutes after the explosion. Eight minutes later, an emergency command post was operating from a nearby café. Three hours after the attack, all the dead and injured had been evacuated. Cleanup and repair crews had the line ready for normal service by 5:30 the next morning.30

Such resilience is common in the United Kingdom as well. “As the authorities became more familiar with the IRA’s modus operandi, they were able to develop procedures that reduced response time and the duration of disruptions,” wrote Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten.31

In the United States, with the exception of PATH and the New York City subways, the attacks on public transportation have not caused long-term disruption and in all cases have resulted in few casualties. Ironically, those two transit systems in New York that suffered the most were not even the targets of the attack.

This low incidence of casualties and of disruption does not translate into immunity. The United States has yet to suffer a major attack on one of its public transportation systems, and U.S. transit systems face real risks.

Risks

Authorities “believe urban rail, commuter rail, and bus and rail terminals are at greatest risk of being targeted in a terrorist event. Bridges and tunnels are perceived to be slightly less at risk. Bus vehicles and ferries are considered the least likely targets for terrorist activities,” wrote Annabelle Boyd and John P. Sullivan.32

Roll-on/roll-off passenger ferries “may be vulnerable to the use of a car bomb attack, aimed at damaging, disabling or sinking the vessel, causing fire on board and/or harm to the passengers and the crew,” according to the International Chamber of Shipping.33 The immense catalog of disasters at sea indicates the possibilities for high casualties in an attack on a ferry, particularly if it causes fire on board. At least four U.S. cities have commuter ferry lines.

“Bus explosions cause less disruption to a system than attacks on railways. If the bus is halted and evacuated, or even if the bomb detonates causing casualties, traffic can be rerouted and service restored more easily,” wrote Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten.34 However, as their work shows, buses were the targets of 32 percent of terrorist attacks on public transportation worldwide from mid-1997 through the end of 2000.35

Light railways (typically one- or two-car electric trains operating on street trackage or other surface right-of-way and sometimes in tunnels) carry more passengers than buses do and hence have a higher potential for casualties in an attack; also, they are more vulnerable to disruption, as a disabled vehicle can block operations on a line. At least 20 U.S. cities have light rail lines; more are planned or under construction.

Fifteen U.S. cities have “commuter rail”: diesel-powered or electric passenger trains operating on regular railroad lines. A typical train will have hundreds of passengers. Passenger trains—both intercity and commuter trains—accounted for 13 of the recent terrorist attacks cited by Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, but the fatalities were, in all cases but two, 12 or fewer. In the only attack on a passenger train in the United States since 1939 (when saboteurs wrecked the Union Pacific’s City of San Francisco, killing 24), only one person was killed—despite the fact that the saboteurs derailed the train, Amtrak’s Sunset Limited, on a bridge in a remote area of Arizona. In 1993, in the worst U.S. passenger train wreck in the past 50 years, the great majority of passengers survived. Of 210 passengers on board the train (coincidentally the Sunset Limited), 47 died when the train went off a bridge into a bayou minutes after the bridge had been struck and damaged by a barge. The rugged construction of U.S. railroad passenger cars tends to prevent fatalities in all but the worst wrecks, and even then the severe damage is usually restricted to the parts of the train actually impacted in a crash. The saboteurs in Arizona carried out their attack on a lightly used railroad line where they could be fairly sure that the next train would be a passenger train. A similar attack in an urban or suburban area would be more difficult but by no means impossible, and sending a train into a body of water, as happened in the Sunset Limited accident, might kill scores of people—although only three people were killed when terrorists in Turkey did just that in 1992.36

Just as vulnerable to terrorist attack is the subway (“heavy rail” as it is known in the industry, although the trains are smaller and lighter than intercity or commuter passenger trains). Eleven U.S. metropolitan areas have heavy rail rapid transit systems, with electric trains typically four or more cars long running on their own right-of-way, often in tunnels.

During rush hour, a subway train may be carrying over a thousand people, and an explosion, derailment, or biological or chemical attack in the confined space of a tunnel or underground station would hold the potential for high casualties. Nevertheless, in the two most notorious attacks on subways in recent years—the 1995 attacks in Paris and Tokyo—killed fewer than might be expected: 7 and 12 people, respectively.

However, the Tokyo attack, although causing relatively few deaths, resulted in a shockingly high number of casualties. The attackers used sarin, a poison gas, which made more than 5,000 people sick, injuring 3,398 of them, 1,596 seriously.37 The death toll could have been much higher, except that the sarin was hastily concocted and impure. The use of chemical weapons also changed the thinking of transit agencies in the United States about the threats they face.

Response

The Tokyo attack prompted the Washington Area Metropolitan Transit Authority, known as Metro, to initiate a chemical sensor program for its rail lines. The authority wants to equip all 47 of its underground stations with chemical sensors. (Metro also has 36 above-ground stations, which are less vulnerable to chemical or biological attack.) In October 2001, the authority sent letters to Congress and the White House requesting $190 million for security improvements, including sensors to detect chemical and biological agents. So far, Metro has received $49 million. The technology for biological agent detection doesn’t yet exist, however; when the technology is available, the authority hopes to add that capability as well, but that will require funding beyond what has been provided so far. To date, Congress has funded chemical sensors for 12 stations. At this time, Metro has no plans to install chemical sensors in vehicles.38

Since its opening in 1976, Metrorail has earned a reputation as a secure, low-crime system, but the specter of terrorism requires Metro to do more than keep street crime off the subway. Metrorail stations already have attendants and surveillance cameras, and the authority is planning major security improvements:39

Under the watchful eye of Congress, and with federal largesse, the Washington Area Metropolitan Transit Authority is expected to lead the nation in safety, security, and service. In many areas it is a leader, certainly in the deployment of chemical agent sensors. However, transit agencies across the country are also increasing security, partly in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September but also as part of longstanding programs, such as those of the Bay Area Rapid Transit system and the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority.

Responses range from public information to antiterrorism exercises. Two examples from Florida: One of the anthrax victims was a regular passenger on the Tri-Rail commuter trains that operate between West Palm Beach and Miami. Tri-Rail contacted the Centers for Disease Control to get accurate information about anthrax and communicated the information to its passengers within hours.40 At its Miami headquarters, Miami-Dade Transit held an exercise in which police officers playing the role of terrorists infiltrated the building and took hostages.41 (Most large transit systems have their own police force.)

Many transit systems now routinely check vehicles and stations to be sure that no unidentified packages have been left behind. Virtually every transit agency is at least examining its security and determining areas of vulnerability that can be remedied.

Planning for Protection

Best practices within the transit industry are being shared and examined for implementation where appropriate.

Britain, which experienced decades of terrorist assault by the Irish Republican Army, makes use of architectural liaison officers, bomb shelter areas, blast-resistant litter bins, closed-circuit television, and communications, training, testing, patrols, and public involvement to obstruct terrorist activity.42 Across Britain, passenger railways have adopted measures to suit their needs and shared their best practices with each other. Improved visibility at stations is a part of every security program—many systems employ closed-circuit television and make use of better lighting, mirrors, open space, and reduced vegetation at outdoor stations.43

In the United States, government and industry assistance for planning transit system security takes many forms.

The John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center has published a Transit Security Handbook44 explaining the Federal Transit Administration’s State Safety Oversight Rule (49 U.S. Code, section 5330). The handbook covers development of a State Security Oversight Program, establishment of a rail transit police or security department, development of a System Security Program Plan, deployment of uniformed and plainclothes police and security personnel, crime prevention through environmental design, situation crime prevention techniques for rail facility design and operation, use and management of security technology, and techniques for crime data collection and analysis. The last item is particularly significant in light of the 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo cult. The group had been implicated in kidnapping and murders and had carried out biological and chemical attacks in public places (including an attack using sarin), yet virtually none of the crimes was investigated by the police.45

Improving Transit Security,46 published by the Transportation Research Board, deals with crime and relates experiences of transit systems in combating crime. The board’s Transportation System Security web page47 includes information on general transportation security and surface transportation security.

The Federal Transit Administration’s Office of Safety and Security published 186 pages of “Critical Incident Management Guidelines”48 in 1998. The main sections—“Comprehensive Emergency Management,” “Problem Identification, Hazard Analysis, Risk Assessment, and Planning,” “Emergency Preparedness,” “Crisis Mitigation,” “Response,” “Recovery,” “Intentional Acts: Addressing Transit Terrorism,” and “Assisting with Community Disaster Response and Recovery”—focus primarily on responding to emergencies. The guidelines generally divide response to terrorism into two components: crisis management and consequence management.

In 1985, the Volpe Center, funded by the Urban Mass Transit Administration, published “Recommended Emergency Preparedness Guidelines for Rail Transit Systems,”49 covering emergency rail plan development, training, facilities and equipment, and vehicles. The guidelines recommend that transit agencies develop policies and procedures for emergency actions (for example, “If it is decided to uncouple derailed or burning cars from trains for evacuation of passengers, who makes the decision to use this strategy?”), establish inter-organizational agreements to cover emergency response, assign transit system functions and responsibilities in emergencies, and create decision-making aids to speed emergency response. “Training improvements should focus on familiarizing fire and life safety personnel and transit system personnel with each other’s facilities, equipment, operations, and supporting documentation.” The guidelines emphasize the need for emergency drills and public awareness, as well as the need to design for emergencies—for example, constructing tunnels with passenger evacuation in mind and provision for pumping out flood water. (The PATH tunnels from New Jersey to the World Trade Center suffered flooding after the collapse of the towers.)

The American Public Transportation Association has produced “Checklists for Emergency Response Planning and System Security,” which covers everything from developing a plan to ensuring that security checklists are regularly used.50

To defend public transportation against terrorism, the tools are there, and so is the experience, both in America and abroad. Although the months since 11 September have seen a new focus on transit security, many systems, particularly the larger ones, have had longstanding efforts to combat terrorism. While to some extent their efforts are reactive, there is emphasis on preparing for the unexpected. Refreshingly absent from the documents, guidance, and best practices are references to “the foreseeable future.” The events of 11 September emphasized the fact that there is no such thing. That may be the most valuable lesson learned.

Click on an end note to return to the article.

1. Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2001), pp. 67–72; http://transweb.sjsu.edu/publications/terrorism_final.pdf.

2. Celia W. Dugger, “Hindu Rioters Kill 60 Muslims in India,” New York Times, 1 March 2002.

3. Brian Michael Jenkins, Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons From Terrorist Activities (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 1997), p. 1; http://transweb.sjsu.edu/publications/terrorism/terrorism.pdf.

4. Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, p. 73.

5. Ibid., pp. 75–99.

6. Ibid.

7. Bruce Becker, “PATH’s Heroic Efforts,” ESPA (Empire State Passengers Association) Express, November-December 2001; www.trainweb.com/espa/espa1201.htm.

8. “Port Authority Board OKs $544 Million Program to Restore PATH Service to Lower Manhattan, Begins Planning for Redevelopment of WTC Site,” Port Authority of New York and New Jersey press release, 13 December 2001; http://panynj.gov/pr/pressrelease.php3?id=127.

9. Run by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which operates all rapid transit lines in New York City except the two PATH lines from New Jersey.

10. “New York City Subways—After Sept 11,” ESPA Express, November–December 2001; www.trainweb.com/espa/espa1201.htm.

11. Passenger Transport interview with Federal Transit Administrator Jennifer Dorn, 11 January 2002; www.apta.com/news/pt/dorn1.htm.

12. “APTA at Forefront of Industry’s Response to Security Threats” in America Under Threat (Washington, DC: American Public Transportation Association, 2001), p. 7; www.apta.com/services/911.pdf.

13. Passenger Transport interview.

14. Shaun P. McCarthy, “The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority: Contingency Planning for the 1996 Olympics” in Brian Michael Jenkins’ Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons From Terrorist Activities, p. 55.

15. Ibid., p. 56.

16. “MARTA’s Policing Strategy Faces a Timely Launch,” in America Under Threat, p. 24.

17. Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, p. 43.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 44.

20. T. R. Hickey, “PATCO’s Security Drill Pre-empted by Real Threat” in America Under Threat, p. 17.

21. Steve Dunham, “Bus System Did Part After Sept. 11 Attack,” Fredericksburg, VA, Free Lance–Star, 11 November 2001; http://fredericksburg.com/News/FLS/2001/112001/11112001/438139.

22. “Mobilizing the Region,” Issue 337, 8 October 2001; www.tstc.org/bulletin/20011008/mtr33702.htm.

23. Judy Rife, “Ferries to Play Bigger Role in NYC Commute,” Times Herald-Record (Bergen County, NJ), 24 January 2002; www.recordonline.com/archive/2002/01/24/jrferry.htm.

24. Ibid.

25. “About the VRE,” “Performance Statistics: Ridership Growth”; www.vre.org/about/performance/sld004.htm.

26. Steve Dunham.

27. Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, p. 2.

28. Brian Michael Jenkins, p. 10.

29. Ibid., p. 17.

30. Ibid., p. 22.

31. Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, p. 20.

32. Annabelle Boyd and John P. Sullivan, “Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism,” Transportation Research News, May–June 2000, p. 14; www.nationalacademies.org/trb/publications/trnews/transit_security.pdf.

33. “Guidance for Shipowners, Ship Operators and Masters on the Protection of Ships From Terrorism and Sabotage” (London: International Chamber of Shipping, 2001), p. 3; www.unols.org/rvoc/ics_guidence.pdf.

34. Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, p. 10.

35. Ibid., p. 71.

36. Brian Michael Jenkins, p. 165.

37. Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, p. 57.

38. Phone interview with Ray Feldmann of the Washington Area Metropolitan Transit Authority, 4 March 2002.

39. Washington Area Metropolitan Transit Authority, press release, “What’s New for Metro in 2002,” 17 January 2002; www.wmata.com/about/Met_news/200201/pr_whatsnew.htm.

40. “Tri-Rail Battles Rumors; Operates Proactively” in America Under Threat, p. 19.

41. “Miami-Dade Transit on High Security Alert” in America Under Threat, p. 25.

42. Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, pp. 16–19.

43. Ibid., pp. 30–32.

44. www.nationalacademies.org/trb/publications/security/TransitSecurityHandbook.pdf.

45. See David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall’s The Cult at the End of the World (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996).

46. http://nationalacademies.org/trb/publications/tcrp/tsyn21.pdf.

47. www4.trb.org/trb/homepage.nsf/web/security.

48. http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/Publications/emergency/Critical_Incident_Management_Guidelines.pdf.

49. http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/Publications/Emergency/Rec_EmerPrep/repg_rts.pdf.

50. www.apta.com/services/safety/checklist.htm.